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I. INTRODUCTION 
On February 8, 2011, Ohio Governor John Kasich signed into law a bill 
establishing a public–private development corporation (PPDC) named 
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JobsOhio.1 In essence, JobsOhio privatized the former Ohio Department of 
Development as a means of attracting greater economic interest to the state 
more quickly than a government agency could.2 Unlike public entities, 
however, JobsOhio is not subject to public records laws,3 state ethics laws,4 
open meeting restrictions,5 or purchasing order procedures.6 Instead, a nine-
member board of directors with gubernatorial appointments meets quarterly, 
out of public view, to discuss economic development strategy and decide 
which private businesses will receive tax subsidies.7 Funding for the 
corporation’s business subsidies comes from private donations and profits 
gained through Ohio’s “lucrative [public] liquor enterprise,” which JobsOhio 
leased for $1.4 billion.8 
The establishment of JobsOhio immediately raised concerns over its 
legality under the Ohio Constitution.9 Editorials across the state sprung to life 
with admonitions against the governor and state legislature for spending public 
money behind a “veil of secrecy.”10 Two provisions under the state 
                                                                                                                     
 1 H.B. 1, 129th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2011) (codified at OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 187.01 (LexisNexis 2014)). 
 2 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 187.01 (LexisNexis 2014) (“The governor is hereby 
authorized to form a nonprofit corporation, to be named ‘JobsOhio,’ with the purposes of 
promoting economic development, job creation, job retention, job training, and the 
recruitment of business to this state.”). 
 3 Id. § 187.04(C).  
 4 Id. § 187.03(A).  
 5 Id.  
 6 Id.  
 7 Id. §§ 187.01(C), (F)(7), 187.04(A).  
 8 Jim Provance, JobsOhio Exempt from Public Records Laws, State Supreme Court 
Rules, BLADE (Dec. 3, 2013), https://www.toledoblade.com/Economy/2013/12/03/ 
JobsOhio-exempt-from-public-records-laws-state-Supreme-Court-rules.html [http://perma.cc/ 
QW33-YXCP].  
 9 See generally Sarah Osmer, Comment, Faster. Cheaper. Unconstitutional: Why the 
Public’s Subsidy of JobsOhio Violates Article VIII, Sections 4 & 6 of the Ohio 
Constitution, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 919 (2012) (arguing that the structure of JobsOhio 
violates the provisions of the Ohio Constitution that prohibit the commingling of public 
money with private enterprise). 
 10 See, e.g., JobsOhio Must Be Accountable, CINCINNATI.COM (Mar. 22, 2013), 
http://archive.cincinnati.com/article/20130322/EDIT01/303220046/JobsOhio-must-accountable 
[http://perma.cc/6bud-u664] (“The legislation that set up the organization was whipped 
through by the Republican-controlled Legislature despite serious reservations by many 
over the secrecy built into its structure. The legislation established JobsOhio as a private 
entity and created a veil of secrecy for the work of this new corporation. JobsOhio has been 
called a public–private entity, or a quasi-private organization, but it is more private than 
public. The law carefully constructed a wall to keep much of its activity secret.”); Kasich 
Needs Deal-Makers Acting in Public, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-SUN (Feb. 2, 2011), 
http://www.springfieldnewssun.com/news/lifestyles/philosophy/kasich-needs-deal-makers-
acting-in-public/nNnBz/ [http://perma.cc/4B9W-S8JM] (“Private—let’s be frank, secret—
development organizations too often want to have their cake and eat it, too. They want the 
public’s money, without which they’d be financially impotent, but the directors also want 
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constitution expressly prohibit the commingling of public money to support 
private enterprise.11 Without transparency and accountability, one 
commentator has noted, Ohio is vulnerable to the same financial abuses that 
have plagued public–private development corporations in other states.12 
Despite these widespread concerns, citizen groups have been unsuccessful 
in their challenges to the constitutionality of JobsOhio. In June 2014, the Ohio 
Supreme Court held that a private group of concerned citizens lacked the 
requisite standing to sue the public–private development corporation.13 
ProgressOhio, a nonprofit group organized under 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4), 
brought suit against JobsOhio for declaratory and injunctive relief.14 It sought 
a declaration that the development corporation violated the Ohio Constitution 
and an injunction to halt its continued operation.15 Five Justices, however, 
found that the citizens’ group lacked a sufficient injury or personal stake in the 
outcome of the controversy to warrant a court ruling on the merits of the 
case.16 Moreover, the majority held that ProgressOhio did not have standing 
                                                                                                                     
to be exempt from the messiness of working in public.”); Plain Dealer Editorial Board, 
JobsOhio Can’t Be Allowed to Hide from the Public, CLEVELAND.COM (Mar. 20, 2013), 
http://www.cleveland.com/opinion/index.ssf/2013/03/jobsohio_cant_be_allowed_to_hi.html 
[http://perma.cc/ZLZ7-ENSR] (noting the reticence of the Kasich Administration to 
comply with a subpoena by Republican State Auditor Dave Yost, and opining that “[t]he 
rule in Ohio should be that public funds are the people’s funds, and that the officials in 
whose custody that money happens to be are merely trustees for the people”);  
Senate Republicans Must Not Rush to Judgment on JobsOhio, VINDY.COM,  
(Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.vindy.com/news/2011/feb/03/senate-republicans-must-not-rush-
to-judg/ [http://perma.cc/XH2G-SQAS] (“It took the Republican-controlled Ohio House of 
Representatives less than a month to pass a bill that stands the state’s economic 
development system on its head. Such a drastic change demanded thoughtful deliberation, 
especially considering that secrecy is one of the underpinnings of the new plan. Instead, 
GOP leaders rammed the legislation through, and in the process rode roughshod over the 
concerns and amendments presented by the minority Democrats.”); see also Dylan Scott, 
The Strange Case of JobsOhio and Public Auditing of Private Firms, GOVERNING  
(June 10, 2013), http://www.governing.com/blogs/view/gov-ohio-officials-battle-over-
auditing-of-economic-development-money.html [http://perma.cc/5K9G-42JG] (describing 
the “unusual” instance of Ohio Republican lawmakers in prohibiting the state auditor from 
investigating how formerly public liquor revenues were being used by JobsOhio).  
 11 OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (“The credit of the state shall not, in any manner, be 
given or loaned to, or in aid of, any individual association or corporation whatever; nor 
shall the state ever hereafter become a joint owner, or stockholder, in any company or 
association, in this state, or elsewhere, formed for any purpose whatever.”); id. § 6 (“No 
laws shall be passed authorizing any county, city, town or township, by vote of its citizens, 
or otherwise, to become a stockholder in any joint stock company, corporation, or 
association whatever; or to raise money for, or to loan its credit to, or in aid of, any such 
company, corporation, or association . . . .”).  
 12 Osmer, supra note 9, at 932.  
 13 ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 13 N.E.3d 1101, 1104–05 (Ohio 2014). 
 14 Id. at 1104. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
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under the state’s public-right doctrine, which exempts the personal-injury 
requirement of standing in the event of an issue that is “of great importance 
and interest to the public.”17 Finally, the Court refused to grant standing to the 
citizens’ group under the JobsOhio Act itself, even though ProgressOhio had 
brought its declaratory judgment action within the ninety-day statute of 
limitations.18 Although the Court assured critics that “a proper party” would 
have standing to sue JobsOhio, the characteristics of such a party remain 
unclear,19 given the fact that the statute of limitations ran out in December 
2011. 
Justice Pfeiffer dissented.20 By denying ProgressOhio standing to sue 
JobsOhio, he wrote, the majority of the Court effectively precluded anyone 
from challenging the constitutionality of the public–private development 
corporation because of the statute’s ninety-day limitation on constitutional 
challenges.21 Justice Pfeiffer would have found the citizens’ group to have 
public-right standing given the important constitutional questions raised.22 
Denying standing to groups like ProgressOhio, Pfeiffer wrote, effectively 
blocked judicial review of constitutionally questionable legislation.23 Pfeiffer’s 
                                                                                                                     
 17 Id. at 1105. Indeed, the Court even called into question the general holding of a 
prior case, which found that the American Academy of Trial Lawyers had public-right 
standing to challenge the 1996 Tort Reform Act, despite not having a traditional injury-in-
fact. Id. at 1106 (questioning the continued validity of State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial 
Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999)).  
 18 Id. at 1107–08.  
 19 ProgressOhio.org, 13 N.E.3d at 1108 (“A proper party—i.e., one with legal 
standing—may unquestionably contest the constitutionality of JobsOhio. As to that proper 
party, the courthouse doors remain open.”). 
 20 Id. at 1110–15 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting). Technically, the Ohio savings statute could 
allow for ProgressOhio to bring a new cause of action within a year of the dismissal of the 
Supreme Court case in light of the case’s dismissal on procedural grounds. See OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2305.19(A) (LexisNexis 2010) (“In any action that is commenced . . . if the 
plaintiff fails otherwise than upon the merits, the plaintiff . . . may commence a new action 
within one year after the date of . . . the plaintiff’s failure otherwise than upon the merits or 
within the period of the original applicable statute of limitations, whichever occurs later.”) 
In fact, the attorney who originally brought the lawsuit against JobsOhio has filed a writ of 
mandamus action in the lower state courts within the savings statute timeframe. Email from 
Victoria Ullmann, Attorney for ProgressOhio, to author (July 26, 2015, 2:30 EST) (on file 
with author). The mandamus avenue is a plausible, albeit difficult, way to force the courts 
to reach the merits of the case. Email from Victoria Ullmann, Attorney for ProgressOhio, 
to author (July 27, 2015, 8:27 EST) (on file with author).  
 21 ProgressOhio.org, 13 N.E.3d at 1110 (Pfeifer, J., dissenting).  
 22 Id. at 1111–12. 
 23 Writing at the end of his opinion, Justice Pfeifer decried the court’s decision as 
denying access to justice for Ohioans:  
Across our state, in every county, there is a courthouse; many of them are historic 
buildings that sit in the center of town and are the center of civic life. In those 
courthouses are dedicated staff and judges who have sworn to “administer justice 
without respect to persons”; there, no lobbyists, no connections, no special 
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dissent illustrates the need for a comprehensive solution that permits citizens 
to challenge the constitutionality of public–private development corporations 
in state court. 
Problems of constitutional accountability exist outside Ohio. The state is 
not alone in its efforts to privatize state economic development operations, as a 
number of other state legislatures have created similarly secretive public–
private development corporations over the last twenty years.24 Besides Rhode 
Island, each state with a PPDC has a provision in its state constitution 
prohibiting the commingling of public money with private enterprise.25 
Conflicts of interest and accountability issues abound. For example, the St. 
Petersburg Times conducted a report on Enterprise Florida, the state’s public–
private development corporation, and found numerous conflicts of interest 
among board members whose companies made financial contributions to 
Enterprise Florida and then received “substantial state subsidies” from the 
corporation.26 The Times later wrote that Enterprise Florida “has shown itself 
to be a public–private venture only in the sense that the public pays and the 
                                                                                                                     
relationships are necessary before a citizen can be heard. Today, we slam the doors on 
all those courthouses, denying Ohioans the opportunity to discover whether their 
government has been true to the Constitution. 
Id. at 1114 (citation omitted) (quoting OHIO REV. CODE § 3.23).  
 24 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1502 (Supp. 2014) (Arizona Commerce 
Authority); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 288.901 (West 2012) (Enterprise Florida, Inc.); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 5-28-3-1 (West 2008) (Indiana Economic Development Corporation); MD. CODE 
ANN., ECON. DEV. § 10-105 (LexisNexis 2008) (Maryland Economic Development 
Corporation); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 207.804 (West 2014) (Michigan Economic 
Growth Authority); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 143B-431.01 (West, Westlaw through 2015 
legislation) (North Carolina Economic Development Partnership); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-
64-4 (2006) (Rhode Island Commerce Corporation); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-2234 (2014) 
(Virginia Economic Development Partnership); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 238.02 (West 2015) 
(Wisconsin Economic Development Corporation); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-12-103 (2015) 
(Wyoming Business Council). Virtually all other states have similar provisions that 
prohibit the mixing of public funds in aid of private business. Ralph L. Finlayson, State 
Constitutional Prohibitions Against Use of Public Financial Resources in Aid of Private 
Enterprise, 1 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 177, 179–80 nn. 3–4 (1988); see also infra 
Part II.B.  
 25 The following state constitutional provisions, along with their article titles, prohibit 
the mixing of public funds with private endeavors: ARIZ. CONST. art. IX, § 7 (Public Debt, 
Revenue, and Taxation); FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 10 (Finance and Taxation); IND. CONST. 
art. XI, § 12 (Corporations); MD. CONST. art. III, § 34 (Legislative Dep’t); MICH. CONST. 
art. 4, § 30 (Legislative Branch); N.C. CONST. art. V, § 3 (Finance); VA. CONST. art. X, 
§ 10 (Taxation and Finance); WIS. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (Finance); WYO. CONST. art. 16, 
§ 6 (Public Indebtedness). For further discussion, see generally Finlayson, supra note 24 
(chronicling state constitutions that include provisions against the lending of public credit 
to private business or owning stock in private enterprise).  
 26 PHILIP MATTERA ET AL., GOOD JOBS FIRST, PUBLIC–PRIVATE POWER GRAB 10  
(Jan. 2011), http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/default/files/docs/pdf/powergrab.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/WZ6K-HRJL]. 
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private receives.”27 In Michigan, a scandal erupted when it was discovered 
that the Michigan Economic Development Corporation (MEDC) approved $9 
million in tax subsidies to a convicted embezzler for a project in Flint, 
Michigan.28 Public outcry arising from the incident prompted the MEDC 
director to offer his letter of resignation, which the Governor ultimately 
declined to accept.29 
Citizens should be allowed to challenge the constitutionality of public–
private development corporations. Even if a state’s highest court ultimately 
upholds the constitutionality of such a development corporation on the merits, 
citizens should have the opportunity to know for sure that their government 
has abided by the law. Given the difficulty of meeting traditional standing 
requirements for private citizen groups, however, a solution that will otherwise 
confer standing on citizens to sue is necessary. 
This Note will argue that a uniform state constitutional amendment 
conferring standing on citizens to challenge the constitutionality of public–
private development corporations is needed to permit access to justice. Part II 
begins with an overview of the evolution of public–private development 
partnerships and corporations. Part III explores the literature surrounding 
traditional standing in federal courts and the principles behind modern day 
standing doctrine. Part IV proposes a uniform state constitutional amendment 
that should either be passed by state legislatures or through voter referenda in 
states that have incorporated JobsOhio-like corporations. In order to allow 
citizen groups access to the courthouse to challenge the constitutionality of 
such corporations, a uniform constitutional amendment is needed. 
II. THE RISE AND RATIONALE OF PUBLIC–PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATIONS 
At the local level, formalized partnerships between government and 
private enterprises have existed for a number of years.30 These public–private 
partnerships (PPPs), which are able to more efficiently provide critical 
services, such as waste disposal, are not inherently negative. Indeed, in many 
circumstances such partnerships promote economic development in ways that 
would not be possible if a private corporation or a public agency were left to 
                                                                                                                     
 27 Id. 
 28 Id. at 9; see also Kristin Longley, State Officials ‘Embarrassed’ After Learning 
$9M in Tax Credits Went to Richard A. Short, Convicted Embezzler, MLIVE  
(Mar. 17, 2010), http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2010/03/state_officials_ 
embarrassed_af.html [http://perma.cc/YZ4S-6JQV]. 
 29 MATTERA ET AL., supra note 26, at 9. 
 30 Kelsey Hogan, Note, Protecting the Public in Public–Private Partnerships: 
Strategies for Ensuring Adaptability in Concession Contracts, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 
420, 424.  
2015] BEHIND CLOSED DOORS 1429 
its own devices.31 In recent years, however, PPPs have expanded from engines 
of urban development to statewide public–private development corporations 
(PPDCs).32 In many instances, the PPDCs that have sprung up on the 
statewide level differ from their local counterparts. 
A. Public–Private Partnerships as Economic Development Engines 
Public-private partnerships are not necessarily a negative public policy 
tool. As a preliminary matter, however, there are a few definitional issues 
when discussing the nature of public–private partnerships. At least three 
strands of PPPs can be readily identified: (1) the government contracting 
model, (2) the privatization of government services approach, and (3) the 
urban regenerative approach.33 The government contracting model reflects the 
history of governments occasionally leaning on private enterprise to bear the 
brunt of costs associated with major infrastructure development.34 The 
privatization approach reflects the trend in the United States of entrusting 
private actors with the provision of formerly public services, such as prison 
operation and education.35 Of the three approaches, the urban regenerative 
approach is most like the modern trend toward statewide development 
corporations because of its focus on economic development.36 
Perhaps the most widely known form of an urban renewal PPP is the 
Business Improvement District (BID).37 “Clothed with limited powers 
                                                                                                                     
 31 Id. at 424–25 (“Private provision of [critical utility] services has been relatively 
uncontroversial because they represent industries where the oft-cited justification for 
PPPs—that the private sector can provide these services more efficiently, effectively, and 
at a lower cost than the government—is most clearly apparent.”).  
 32 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 33 Dominique Custos & John Reitz, Public–Private Partnerships, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 
555, 556 (2010).  
 34 See generally id. at 567–70 (tracing the history of public partnerships with private 
business to develop railroads and utilities, for example).  
 35 See generally Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the 
New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229 (2003) (highlighting the opportunities and risks 
presented by the privatizing of formerly governmental functions, especially in the 
educational context).  
 36 See Richard Briffault, A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement 
Districts and Urban Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 365, 422–23 (1999) (“‘[T]he 
cornerstone of economic development strategies of virtually all U.S. cities’ has been the 
public–private partnership.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Marc V. Levine, The Politics of 
Partnership: Urban Redevelopment Since 1945, in UNEQUAL PARTNERSHIPS: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF URBAN REDEVELOPMENT IN POSTWAR AMERICA 12, 12 (Gregory 
D. Squires ed., 1989))). 
 37 See generally Daniel R. Garodnick, Comment, What’s the BID Deal? Can the 
Grand Central Business Improvement District Serve a Special Limited Purpose?, 148 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1733, 1733 (2000) (describing BIDs as a “regular presence on the municipal 
terrain”); see also Briffault, supra note 36, at 366 (accounting for more than one thousand 
BIDs across the United States); Richard Schragger, Does Governance Matter? The Case of 
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traditionally held by the state, BIDs are private entities that provide 
supplemental sanitation, security, and social services to limited geographic 
areas within cities.”38 BIDs operate by levying higher property taxes on 
residents who live within a district in exchange for services, such as garbage 
collection or street maintenance, that supplement existing city government 
services.39 These district-specific taxes fund the administrative costs of BID 
operation as well as the additional services enjoyed by BID residents.40 BIDs 
generally require the approval of the local government and the majority of 
people with business and property interests in the proposed districts before 
going into effect.41 
BIDs have become popular because they are perceived as more effective 
and efficient at providing services than municipal government.42 Governments 
favor BIDs as cost-saving measures that improve downtown areas and do not 
require tax increases on the general public.43 Commercial merchants and 
business owners favor BIDs because the special taxing districts solve the “free 
rider” problem faced by local chambers of commerce.44 Instead of relying on 
the altruism of a few “civic-minded” volunteer business owners to prop up a 
chamber or merchants’ association, BIDs receive taxes that are valuated by 
property and distributed to improvements and activities that stay within the 
district.45 Richard Briffault, a prominent scholar on urban law and governance, 
has noted that “[e]ven BID critics rarely challenge claims that BID programs 
have improved safety and sanitation within the districts.”46 
Yet, controversy still surrounds BIDs in some respects. A recurring 
critique of BIDs, and PPPs more generally, is their inherent decrease in 
transparency and accountability. Government actors can be voted out of office 
when they fail to deliver quality services to city residents; private actors are 
insulated from such accountability because “[p]rivatization transfers decision-
making power over service delivery and facility operations to the private 
sector, which operates out of public view.”47 Another prevalent line of 
criticism is that BIDs are “undemocratic” because they are comprised of 
                                                                                                                     
Business Improvement Districts and the Urban Resurgence, 3 DREXEL L. REV. 49, 50 
(2010) (“BIDs are now a fixture of American cities and many cities abroad.”). 
 38 See generally Garodnick, supra note 37, at 1733.  
 39 Briffault, supra note 36, at 368–69. 
 40 Id. at 368. 
 41 Id. at 369.  
 42 Id. at 370; Hogan, supra note 30, at 430 (“Many believe that the private sector can 
provide certain services or operate certain facilities more efficiently and effectively than 
the government. The competition and market forces that characterize the private sector 
incentivize high quality service, cost-saving improvements, and the implementation of 
innovative designs and technology.” (footnote omitted)).  
 43 See Briffault, supra note 36, at 369. 
 44 Id. at 369.  
 45 Id. at 369–70. 
 46 Id. at 371.  
 47 Hogan, supra note 30, at 433. 
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specially elected members and because they seem to contradict the idea of 
“equal treatment . . . in the provision of public services.”48 
Although some transparency and accountability is, concededly, sometimes 
eroded with the cession of governmental powers to private players,49 PPPs 
focusing on urban regeneration are not necessarily secretive organizations.50 In 
Baltimore Development Corp. v. Carmel Realty Associates, developers 
requested copies of the meeting minutes of the Baltimore Development 
Corporation (BDC) after submitting development proposals to the BDC for 
buildings they owned within a “Superblock” project in Baltimore.51 The BDC 
President denied the developers’ information request, writing that the BDC 
was not subject to the Maryland Public Information Act because it was a 
“separate non-profit corporation.”52 The functions of the BDC were mostly 
public: the corporation was formed to promote economic development and 
attract businesses to the City of Baltimore; to increase the city’s tax base; its 
members were appointed by the Mayor; and 80 percent of its funding was 
provided by the City of Baltimore.53 Interpreting the Maryland public records 
law, the Maryland Supreme Court found that the BDC was a “public body” 
and thus subject to the requirements of the state statute.54 
Furthermore, local governments have historically been considered quasi-
private, quasi-public entities themselves.55 Richard Briffault has gone as far as 
to characterize local government as “the most ‘private’ level of 
government.”56 Therefore, public–private partnerships developed under the 
auspices of a local government are less problematic in terms of transparency 
and accountability than at first blush, given the quasi-private nature of 
municipal corporations and political subdivisions.57   
                                                                                                                     
 48 Briffault, supra note 36, at 371, 373. 
 49 See Hogan, supra note 30, at 432–33. 
 50 See, e.g., City of Balt. Dev. Corp. v. Carmel Realty Assoc., 910 A.2d 406, 410 
(Md. 2006) (holding that the City of Baltimore Development Corporation was a public 
body for purposes of Maryland’s open meetings and public records laws). 
 51 Id. at 414.  
 52 Id. 
 53 See id. at 424–25. 
 54 Id. at 426–28. 
 55 Briffault, supra note 36, at 471–72; see also Owen v. City of Indep., 445 U.S. 622, 
644–45 (1980) (“On the one hand, the municipality was a corporate body, capable of 
performing the same ‘proprietary’ functions as any private corporation, and liable for its 
torts in the same manner and to the same extent as well. On the other hand, the 
municipality was an arm of the State, and when acting in [a] ‘governmental’ or ‘public’ 
capacity, it shared the immunity traditionally accorded to the sovereign.”); cf. Gerald E. 
Frug, The City As a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1065–67 (1980) (arguing that 
cities are relatively powerless due to their reliance on the state for power and funding and 
because cities “cannot exercise the economic power of private corporations”).  
 56 Briffault, supra note 36, at 374. 
 57 Cf. Audrey G. McFarlane, Putting the “Public” Back into Public–Private 
Partnerships for Economic Development, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 39, 60 (2007) (urging 
courts to take a more active role in monitoring economic development through public–
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B. Purpose of Public–Private Development Corporations 
Every state legislature in the United States has formed some sort of entity, 
whether a public agency or development corporation, whose main function is 
to spur economic growth in the state.58 A few examples will suffice. In 
                                                                                                                     
private partnerships in order to “protect the public interest”). McFarlane notes the growing 
public skepticism of government action, particularly with respect to the use of eminent 
domain for economic development purposes: “Recent actions at the state and local level 
have begun to reflect . . . the current public distrust of certain public–private partnerships 
as well as a strong sentiment that the goals and processes of these partnerships should 
embody the interests of the public.” Id. at 40. 
 58 The following statutes, listed alphabetically by state, establish the primary 
economic development apparatus in each of their respective states: ALA. CODE § 41-9-201 
(LexisNexis 2013) (Alabama Dep’t of Commerce); ALASKA STAT. § 44.33.020 (2014) 
(Alaska Dep’t of Commerce, Community, and Economic Development); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 41-1502 (Supp. 2014) (Arizona Commerce Authority); ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-4-
209 (2009) (Arkansas Economic Development Commission); CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12096.2 
(West 2011) (Governor’s Office of Business and Economic Development); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 24-46-102 (2014) (Colorado Economic Development Commission); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 32-1b (West 2003) (Connecticut Dep’t of Economic and Community 
Development); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5003 (2003) (Delaware Economic Development 
Office); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 288.901 (West 2012) (Enterprise Florida); GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 50-7-1 (2013) (Georgia Dep’t of Economic Development); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201-
2 (West 2008) (Hawaii Dep’t of Business, Economic Development, and Tourism); IDAHO 
CODE § 67-4701 (2014) (Idaho Dep’t of Commerce); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 605/605-7 
(West 2015) (Illinois Dep’t of Commerce and Economic Opportunity); IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 5-28-3-1 (West 2008) (Indiana Economic Development Corporation); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 15.105 (West 2011) (Iowa Economic Development Authority); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-
5002a (West 2008) (Kansas Dep’t of Commerce); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 154.12-050 
(LexisNexis 2009) (Kentucky Cabinet for Economic Development); LA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 51:923 (2003) (Louisiana Dep’t of Economic Development); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, 
§ 13053 (2013) (Maine Dep’t of Economic and Community Development); MD. CODE 
ANN., ECON. DEV. § 10-105 (LexisNexis 2008) (Maryland Economic Development 
Corporation); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 23A, § 1 (LexisNexis 2014) (Massachusetts Office of 
Business Development); MICH COMP. LAWS ANN. § 207.804 (West 2014) (Michigan 
Economic Growth Authority); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116J.01 (West 2014) (Minnesota Dep’t 
of Employment and Economic Development); MISS. CODE ANN. § 57-1-1 (West 1999) 
(Mississippi Dep’t of Economic and Community Development); MO. ANN. STAT. 
§ 620.010 (West 2014) (Missouri Dep’t of Economic Development); MONT. CODE ANN. 
§ 90-1-105 (2014) (Montana Dep’t of Commerce); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 81-1201.02 
(LexisNexis 2011) (Nebraska Dep’t of Economic Development); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 231.043 (LexisNexis 2013) (Nevada Governor’s Office of Economic Development); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-A:1 (2013) (New Hampshire Dep’t of Resources and 
Economic Development); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:1B-4 (West 2011) (New Jersey Economic 
Development Authority); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 9-15-4 (LexisNexis 2011) (New Mexico 
Economic Development Dep’t); N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6254 (McKinney 2012) (New 
York State Urban Development Corporation); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143B-431.01 (West, 
Westlaw through 2015 legislation) (North Carolina Economic Development Partnership); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-34.3-01 (2014) (North Dakota Dep’t of Commerce, Division of 
Economic Development and Finance); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 187.01 (LexisNexis 2014) 
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Alabama, the primary economic development entity is the state Department of 
Commerce, whose purpose is “to promote the development of the state’s 
human, economic and physical resources” to oversee “comprehensive 
statewide planning and economic development.”59 The Maine Department of 
Economic and Community Development was formed to effectuate and 
coordinate the state’s “economic growth and development policies . . . to 
realize the greatest possible degree of effectiveness.”60 Similarly, the Oregon 
Business Development Department was designed to promote economic growth 
in the state through the active recruitment of domestic and international 
business,61 collaborate with Oregon companies to aid in their “expansion or 
help them retain jobs in the state,”62 and to “coordinate state and federal 
economic and community development programs.”63 
The most common type of state economic development arrangement is the 
public agency. A number of states call such an agency the Department of 
Commerce,64 while others refer to their primary economic development entity 
as an Economic Development Office or Department,65 or Department of 
Community Development.66 A few states make explicit the executive-branch 
nature of their respective state economic development agency, by labeling the 
                                                                                                                     
(JobsOhio); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 5003.2 (West 2014) (Oklahoma Dep’t of 
Commerce); OR. REV. STAT. § 285A.070 (2013) (Oregon Business Development Dep’t); 
71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1709.104 (West 2012) (Pennsylvania Dep’t of 
Community and Economic Development); 42 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 42-64-4 (2006) (Rhode 
Island Commerce Corporation); S.C. CODE ANN. § 13-1-10 (1977) (South Carolina Dep’t 
of Commerce); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-53-1 (2012) (Governor’s Office of Economic 
Development); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-3-701 (2015) (Tennessee Dep’t of Economic and 
Community Development); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 481.024 (West 2012) (Texas 
Economic Development Corporation); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63M-1-201 (LexisNexis 2014) 
(Utah Governor’s Office of Economic Development); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 213 (2010) 
(Vermont Economic Development Authority); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-2234 (2014) (Virginia 
Economic Development Partnership); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 43.330.020 (West 2012) 
(Washington Dep’t of Commerce); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-15-6 (LexisNexis 2009) (West 
Virginia Economic Development Authority); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 238.02 (West 2015) 
(Wisconsin Economic Development Corporation); and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-12-103 
(2015) (Wyoming Business Council).  
 59 ALA. CODE § 41-9-200(b) (LexisNexis 2013).  
 60 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 13052 (2013). 
 61 OR. REV. STAT. § 285A.075(1)(d) (2013). 
 62 Id. § 285A.075(1)(e). 
 63 Id. § 285A.075(1)(c).  
 64 E.g., IDAHO CODE § 67-4701 (2014) (Idaho Dep’t of Commerce); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 74-5002a (West 2008) (Kansas Dep’t of Commerce); S.C. CODE ANN. § 13-1-10 (1977) 
(South Carolina Dep’t of Commerce).  
 65 E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5003 (2003) (Delaware Economic Development 
Office); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-7-1 (2013) (Georgia Dep’t of Economic Development). 
 66 E.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 13053 (2013) (Maine Dep’t of Economic and 
Community Development); 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1709.104 (West 2012) 
(Pennsylvania Dep’t of Community and Economic Development). 
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agency the “Governor’s Office of Economic Development.”67 The 
arrangement of these agencies is straightforward. All are public entities, 
organized as executive branch departments under the state government,68 and 
subject to normal public accountability requirements, such as public records 
laws.69 
Two examples of unique economic development agencies stand out: New 
York and Vermont. In New York, the Urban Development Corporation was 
initially formed in 1968 as a public entity to promote economic development 
throughout the state.70 The mandate of the corporation at the time was to 
“generate industrial, commercial and civic development in distressed urban 
areas . . . through the construction of low- and moderate-income housing.”71 
Since then, the aim of the corporation has expanded to include promotion of 
economic development more generally.72 The unique aspect of the New York 
economic development entity is its nature as a purely public development 
corporation. For example, the corporation maintains all the flexibility and 
powers of a development corporation like JobsOhio,73 while still being subject 
to transparency requirements and public meetings.74 
The Vermont Economic Development Authority (VEDA) was similarly 
created as a “public instrumentality” of the state of Vermont,75 designed to 
promote economic development.76 Like the New York Urban Development 
Corporation, VEDA functions as a corporation, but is organized as a state 
agency and subject to reporting and disclosure requirements.77 Its primary 
function is to serve as a financial lender to various industrial enterprises, small 
businesses, and agricultural endeavors.78 One benefit of VEDA is its low-
interest program, which allows for more liquid financing and, according to a 
state website, “help[s] Vermont’s economy grow and prosper.”79 
                                                                                                                     
 67 E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 231.043 (LexisNexis 2013) (Nevada Governor’s 
Office of Economic Development).  
 68 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 50-7-1 (2013) (“There is created as part of the 
executive branch of the state government the Department of Economic Development.”). 
 69 See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 13-1-25 (1977) (Public monies defined; accountability 
and disclosure requirements; reporting requirements); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-3-730(a) 
(2015) (Records).  
 70 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6252 (McKinney 2012). 
 71 History of Empire State Development, N.Y. ST. EMPIRE ST. DEV., 
http://www.empire.state.ny.us/AboutUs/History.html [http://perma.cc/NEE4-8JWX]. 
 72 Id. 
 73 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 6255.  
 74 See Public Meetings & Notices, N.Y. ST. EMPIRE ST. DEV., 
http://www.empire.state.ny.us/PublicMeetings_Notices.html [http://perma.cc/J7A2-K44T]. 
 75 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 213 (2010). 
 76 Id. § 211. 
 77 Id. § 217 (Records; annual report; audit). 
 78 About VEDA, VEDA, http://www.veda.org/about-veda/ [http://perma.cc/LM3Q-
KJVD].  
 79 Id. 
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Public-private development corporations like JobsOhio generally share the 
same purpose as state-operated economic development agencies. For instance, 
the Arizona Commerce Authority was established to “provide private sector 
leadership in growing and diversifying the economy of the state,” with a focus 
on creating high quality employment and attracting and retaining businesses.80 
Along similar lines, the Indiana Economic Development Corporation was 
formed to coordinate the state’s economic growth efforts and to encourage job 
creation and the “promotion of Indiana.”81 Finally, the Wyoming Business 
Council—nominally a council, but in reality a public–private development 
corporation—is tasked with preparing and carrying out the state’s economic 
development and promotional program as well as encouraging and 
“solicit[ing] private sector involvement, support and funding for economic 
development in the state.”82 
Thus, at a basic level, the purpose of public–private development 
corporations like JobsOhio is the same as their public agency counterparts—
economic development and job creation. As the New York and Vermont 
examples demonstrate, some states have even created a public-backed 
development corporation, subject to transparency and accountability laws, in 
order to spur economic growth. Conceivably, then, states might create a PPDC 
that is both flexible as an economic development tool and transparent. The 
PPDCs that are the focus of this Note, however, have not taken that route. 
 
C. “Veil of Secrecy”83: The Problem with Public–Private Development 
Corporations 
Unlike their public counterparts, public–private development corporations 
are routinely not subject to the same transparency and accountability 
standards. The Arizona Commerce Authority (ACA), for example, has broad 
authority to enter into executive session—out of public view—to discuss the 
granting of public subsidies to private businesses.84 Playing “Kingmaker,” the 
leadership of the ACA “chooses which businesses to assist and which to 
ignore, with few checks and balances.”85 Although the ACA was originally 
                                                                                                                     
 80 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1502(A) (2014). 
 81 IND. CODE § 5-28-1-1(a) (2008). 
 82 WYO. STAT. ANN. § 9-12-105(a) (2015). 
 83 See supra note 10. This Note does not pass judgment on the wisdom of public–
private development corporations, as a policy matter. My argument centers around the need 
for transparency and ability of citizens to challenge the arguably unconstitutional structures 
of PPDCs like JobsOhio, the Arizona Commerce Authority, the Indiana Economic 
Development Corporation, and other similar organizations. Whether PPDCs are, in fact, 
unconstitutional is beyond the scope of this paper and largely depends on the interpretation 
by state courts of their respective state constitutions.  
 84 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1502(I) (2014). 
 85 Emily Gersema, AZ Commerce Cronies: Picking and Choosing Winners with Your 
Tax Dollars, GOLDWATER INST. (Mar. 20, 2014), http://goldwaterinstitute.org/en/ 
1436 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 76:6 
touted as a means to increase economic growth on a statewide level, grants 
such as the $100,000 given to a Flagstaff ice cream cone maker appear to have 
little benefit beyond the municipal level.86 The Republican Senate president in 
Arizona was skeptical of turning the state Department of Commerce into a 
public–private corporation for lack of accountability and has maintained his 
concern: “You’d have a big pot of money, and really nobody to oversee it.”87 
To take another example, the primary economic development engine of 
Florida—Enterprise Florida—has also faced significant criticism for lack of 
accountability and transparency.88 Approximately 85 percent of Enterprise 
Florida funding is public, while only 15 percent comes from private, corporate 
donations.89 Tax subsidies given to Enterprise Florida Board members such as 
Hewlett Packard and Wells Fargo have at least created the perception of “pay-
to-play” and other conflicts of interest.90 Coupled with certain exemptions 
from state public records laws,91 such perceptions have cast a shadow over the 
dealings of Enterprise Florida, as they have with other public–private 
development corporations. 
In essence, the concerns that have long motivated critics of local public–
private partnerships now have been expanded writ large.92 In the nineteenth 
century, many states nearly went bankrupt when railroad companies—aided by 
issuance of public bonds—either never constructed the promised rail lines, or 
                                                                                                                     
work/topics/free-enterprise/entrepreneurship/arizona-commerce-cronies-picking-and-choosing-
winn/ [http://perma.cc/3YCH-E7Q7].  
 86 Id.  
 87 Id. 
 88 See BEN WILCOX & DAN KRASSNER, INTEGRITY FLORIDA, ENTERPRISE FLORIDA: 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OR CORPORATE WELFARE? 12 (Feb. 2013), 
http://integrityflorida.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Enterprise-Florida-Economic-Develop 
ment-or-Corporate-Welfare-FINAL.pdf [http://perma.cc/5BA6-4UTB]. 
 89 Id. at 5. 
 90 Id. at 5–6. 
 91 Sunshine Law, Enterprise Florida, Inc., Fla. Att’y Gen. Advisory Legal Opinion 
No. AGO 92-80 (Nov. 5, 1992) (advising the Secretary of Commerce that Enterprise 
Florida is exempt from disclosing records related to corporate donors).  
 92 See Osmer, supra note 9, at 920–22 (noting the public-subsidized railroad crisis of 
the early 1800s led to mass corruption, public outcry, and ultimately two constitutional 
provisions prohibiting public aid to private enterprise); see also David E. Pinsky, State 
Constitutional Limitations on Public Industrial Financing: An Historical and Economic 
Approach, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 265, 277–82 (1963) (summarizing the responses of many 
states to the railroad-aid crisis in passing constitutional provisions barring the use of public 
funds to aid private business); Nick Beermann, Comment, Legal Mechanisms of Public–
Private Partnerships: Promoting Economic Development or Benefiting Corporate 
Welfare?, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 175, 180–81 (1999) (tracing the history of public 
subsidies of railroads in Washington, which largely led to many states skirting bankruptcy, 
and the resultant state constitutional provision that proscribed public lending of credit to 
private enterprise).  
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were terribly mismanaged.93 States responded by passing constitutional 
provisions barring the use of public funds to aid private enterprise.94 
Modern public–private development corporations appear to circumvent the 
wave of state constitutional prohibitions against providing public funds to 
support private corporations.95 The biggest issue, however, is lack of certainty 
over whether a PPDC violates its respective state constitution. Given the 
reluctance of the Ohio Supreme Court to grant standing to private groups to 
challenge the constitutionality of JobsOhio,96 other state courts may also be 
hesitant to open the courthouse doors to determine the constitutionality of a 
PPDC. 
State courts should not be so reluctant to decide the merits question of 
whether a particular financing arrangement is unconstitutional. The Kentucky 
Supreme Court, for example, reached the question of whether providing tax 
incentives and public–private financing to Toyota Motor Corporation violated 
the state constitution.97 In order to attract Toyota to bring its business to 
Kentucky, the Governor and General Assembly agreed to purchase a 1600-
acre tract of land for $35 million, to be paid through a revenue bond issue 
generated by the State Property and Buildings Commission.98 All funds used 
to pay for the debt service, bonds, principal and interest, would be paid out of 
“appropriations from the General Funds of the Commonwealth.”99 
In a 4-3 vote, the Kentucky Supreme Court upheld the financing plan as 
constitutional because it served a “public purpose.”100 Two private citizens, as 
well as the State Budget Director, had intervened to challenge the 
constitutionality of the financial arrangement.101 The Court defined the parties 
in interest in broad language, saying it was the people of the Commonwealth 
who had a stake in knowing whether their government had been true to the 
                                                                                                                     
 93 Beermann, supra note 92, at 180–81. 
 94 Pinsky, supra note 92, at 281 (“The public was commonly burdened with enormous 
debt while its interest in improved transportation, which motivated projects in the first 
place, was completely or substantially frustrated. The nineteenth-century experience which 
gave rise to the public aid limitations [in state constitutions] demonstrates that if public 
funds are to be risked, the risk must flow from public rather than private decision.”).  
 95 Osmer, supra note 9, at 939 (“Many of the reasons that nineteenth-century Ohioans 
initially sought to prohibit public investment in private enterprise—concerns of 
inefficiencies, ineffectiveness, corruption, favoritism and fraud—are the same type of 
issues other states have experienced in the previous twenty years with entities designed 
similar to JobsOhio.”). 
 96 See supra Part I. 
 97 Hayes v. State Prop. & Bldg. Comm’n, 731 S.W.2d 797 (Ky. 1987); see also Helen 
Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1858–59 (2001). 
 98 Hayes, 731 S.W.2d at 798. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 799. 
 101 Id. at 798–99. 
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Constitution.102 Such a pronouncement stands in stark contrast to the decision 
of the Ohio Supreme Court, which denied standing to a private group to 
challenge the state public–private development corporation under a 
functionally identical provision of the Ohio Constitution.103 
Despite clear concerns over the transparency, accountability, and 
constitutionality of PPDCs, there is no clear answer as to their legality. 
Although some courts like the Kentucky Supreme Court are willing to 
entertain challenges on the merits arising under state constitutional provisions 
that prohibit public aid to private businesses, others are not or may not be so 
willing. Therefore, it is important to understand how private groups may 
achieve standing in their respective state courts to challenge the 
constitutionality of public–private development corporations. 
III. STANDING 
To fully understand the nature of standing in state courts, it is useful to 
survey the development of standing doctrine in the federal courts. Historically, 
standing in the federal judicial system has been rather restrictive in light of the 
constraint on federal courts that they may only hear cases that form a “case or 
controversy” under Article III of the U.S. Constitution.104 State standing 
doctrine need not, and should not, exactly mirror federal justiciability 
requirements because state courts are not subject to the constraints of the 
federal Constitution, among other reasons. Indeed, state courts should 
experiment with standing criteria, and adopt more easily satisfied 
requirements. 
A. Standing in Federal Court: A Review 
Standing doctrine is the gatekeeper to state and federal court. “In essence,” 
the Supreme Court has held, “the question of standing is whether the litigant is 
entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular 
issues.”105 Black-letter law tells us that, in order to sue a defendant in federal 
court, a plaintiff must satisfy the following criteria: (1) the plaintiff must have 
suffered from an “injury in fact,” meaning the invasion of a legally protected 
interest that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the 
defendant’s alleged conduct must exist; and (3) it must be likely, “as opposed 
                                                                                                                     
 102 Id. at 799 (“In a practical sense, the parties who have a real interest are the people 
of this Commonwealth who have a right to a determination of whether the executive and 
the legislature have acted within the limitations of their constitutional power, the executive 
and legislative branches of government who sponsored and enacted the legislation, and 
Toyota, the industry induced to come to this Commonwealth.”). 
 103 See supra Part I. 
 104 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.  
 105 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).  
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to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable 
decision.’”106 
The literature on standing in federal court is well-developed,107 and 
extensive treatment of the subject is beyond the scope of this Note. Suffice it 
to say, however, that the ease of reciting the black-letter law of standing is 
                                                                                                                     
 106 E.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (citing Friends of 
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000)); Lujan v. Defs. of 
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 
U.S. 26, 41–42 (1976)). 
 107 As one eminent observer has noted, the purposes of standing and various arguments 
in the literature surrounding the issue are “numbingly familiar.” William A. Fletcher, The 
Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 222 (1988); see, e.g., Heather Elliott, The 
Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 459 (2008) (concluding that standing 
doctrine does not effectively serve the “separation of powers” function that is often 
suggested); Bradford C. Mank, Standing for Private Parties in Global Warming Cases: 
Traceable Standing Causation Does Not Require Proximate Causation, 2012 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 869, 870 (2012) (“[C]ourts should apply a relatively liberal approach in deciding 
standing issues for private plaintiffs pursuing climate change suits, even if courts 
ultimately conclude that it is inappropriate to grant relief on the merits to those same 
plaintiffs.”); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REV. 68, 102 (1984) 
(arguing for a broader conception of the injury-in-fact requirement for traditional standing 
to give greater respect for intangible legal injuries, which would result in a “clean[er]” 
doctrine and a “lowered access threshold”); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and 
Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 511 (1996) 
(arguing that, while efficiency in the name of separation of powers is an important ideal, 
the Supreme Court should reevaluate its justiciability doctrine to acknowledge the equally 
important ideals of the judiciary’s “coordinate function of adjudicating federal law cases to 
promote liberty, the rule of law, and checks an balances, yet also recognizes the need to 
exercise that jurisdiction with due regard for governmental efficiency”); Cass R. Sunstein, 
What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” and Article III, 91 MICH. L. 
REV. 163, 166 (1992) (contending that Lujan’s invalidation of a Congressional grant of 
standing was a “misrepresentation of the Constitution”); Ann Woolhandler & Caleb 
Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689, 689 (2004) 
(arguing that standing had its roots in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and is thus 
not a “recent invention” by federal judges, contrary to the belief of some critics); Edward 
A. Zelinsky, Putting State Courts in the Constitutional Driver’s Seat: State Taxpayer 
Standing After Cuno and Winn, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 1, 2 (2012) (evaluating the state 
of state taxpayer standing in federal courts after two Supreme Court decisions addressing 
the issue and concluding that such suits will be funneled from federal courts into state 
courts, which will be able to adopt and manage state taxpayer standing challenges given 
state courts’ more liberal standing rules); Christopher S. Elmendorf, Note, State Courts, 
Citizen Suits, and the Enforcement of Federal Environmental Law by Non-Article III 
Plaintiffs, 110 YALE L.J. 1003, 1003 (2001) (arguing that state courts “can, should, and 
will” adjudicate the federal environmental claims of parties who lack Article III standing in 
light of the generally more liberal standing principles in state courts); Kelsey McCowan 
Heilman, Comment, The Rights of Others: Protection and Advocacy Organizations’ 
Associational Standing to Sue, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 237, 272–78 (2008) (arguing that barring 
associational standing to protection and advocacy organizations for the mentally disabled 
would often result in rights violations going unaddressed).  
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belied by its complicated and circuitous development at the Supreme Court.108 
Although the Supreme Court itself has admitted the law of standing is not 
precisely coherent,109 the doctrine does illuminate important values regarding 
the role of courts in the American judicial system.110 Such values include the 
separation of powers,111 management of limited judicial resources,112 
improving judicial decision making by ensuring a specific controversy is 
before the court,113 and protecting against the “intermeddling” of petitioners 
trying to protect the rights of third parties.114 With the increase in recognition 
of constitutional rights over time, and the concomitant expansion of potential 
plaintiffs, the Supreme Court has become more concerned with issues of 
standing.115 
Federal courts have generally been wary of allowing plaintiffs to bring 
“generalized grievances” before a judicial body.116 Justice Scalia has written 
that the Supreme Court has “consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a 
generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to his 
and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution” will not 
satisfy the standing requirements imposed by Article III.117 “Vindicating the 
public interest,” which includes ensuring governmental adherence to the 
Constitution and federal laws, “is the function of Congress and the Chief 
Executive.”118 Thus, honoring the constitutional separation of powers is often 
                                                                                                                     
 108 See generally Nichol, supra note 107 (charting throughout the uncertain contours of 
standing doctrine at the federal level). 
 109 Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, 454 
U.S. 464, 475 (1982) (“We need not mince words when we say that the concept of ‘Art. III 
standing’ has not been defined with complete consistency in all of the various cases 
decided by this Court . . . .”); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 55 (6th ed. 
2012).  
 110 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 109, at 55. 
 111 Id. at 56.  
 112 Kenneth E. Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court—A Functional Analysis, 86 
HARV. L. REV. 645 (1973) (decrying the recent liberalization of the Court’s standing 
doctrine and advocating a new theory of standing that emphasizes the doctrine’s role as a 
rationing mechanism of limited judicial resources).  
 113 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 109, at 57. 
 114 Id.  
 115 See PETER W. LOW ET AL., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL–STATE 
RELATIONS 254–56 (8th ed. 2014).  
 116 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575 (1992).  
 117 Id. at 573. 
 118 Id. at 576; Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing As an Essential Element of the 
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 894 (1983) (“There is . . . a functional 
relationship [between standing and separation of powers], which can best be described by 
saying that the law of standing roughly restricts courts to their traditional undemocratic 
role of protecting individuals and minorities against impositions of the majority, and 
excludes them from the even more undemocratic role of prescribing how the other two 
branches should function in order to serve the interest of the majority itself.”). 
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a primary reason for federal courts when they decline to hear a case on its 
merits based on standing grounds. 
B. Standing in State Court: An Opportunity for Experimentation 
As the discussion above demonstrates, federal standing doctrine 
emphasizes the notion that, at the national level, courts are bodies of limited 
jurisdiction and should only hear cases that meet certain requirements. State 
courts need not be so limited, however. Legal reasoning, including the 
differences between state and federal courts, supports broader standing 
doctrines in state courts. Further, public policy favors allowing citizens easier 
access to the courthouse at the state level. 
1. Legal Theory Supports Broader State Court Standing 
State courts differ in important respects from their federal counterparts. 
States, and their respective constitutions, were initially designed to facilitate 
change—particularly in relation to the federal Constitution. One important 
difference between state and federal courts, moreover, is the fact that state 
courts are not organized under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which 
imposes the familiar “cases and controversies” requirement for all claims 
brought before a federal court.119 Thus, state courts can serve as “laboratories” 
for experimenting with standing doctrine,120 either through judicial common 
law, state statute, or constitutional amendment. 
State constitutions were designed as change agents.121 “Unlike the largely 
rigid federal Constitution,” Judge Jeffrey Sutton writes, “the state constitutions 
were not fixed.”122 In other words, because state constitutions could be more 
easily amended than the federal Constitution, they were constructed as 
“incubators” for all manner of majoritarian-based change.123 Allowing state 
legislatures and courts to experiment in their respective Brandeisian 
                                                                                                                     
 119 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (extending the federal judicial power to all cases arising 
under the laws and treaties of the United States; affecting ambassadors, public ministers 
and consuls; and any case of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction).  
 120 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, 
if its citizen choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.”); see also Hans A. Linde, The State and Federal 
Courts in Governance: Vive La Différence!, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1273, 1287–88 
(2005) (advising state courts not to adopt a “rigid adherence” to federal justiciability 
guidelines for the sake of following federal court decisions).  
 121 Jeffrey S. Sutton, Review, Court’s as Change Agents: Do We Want More—or 
Less?, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1419, 1422 (2014) (reviewing EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR 
RIGHTS IN ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S 
POSITIVE RIGHTS (2013)).  
 122 Id. 
 123 See id.  
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“laboratories” of democracy can lead to a robust debate that permits federal 
courts—and even the Supreme Court—to “learn from the states.”124 
Apart from the deliberative benefits of experimenting with standing 
doctrine in the state courts, other justifications support easily satisfied standing 
requirements at the state level. Helen Hershkoff has written a seminal and in-
depth article exploring the many reasons why state courts should not adhere to 
restrictive federal justiciability standards.125 She writes that “state courts may 
be conforming to federal limits because of the perceived dominance of 
Article III jurisprudence without independently assessing how best to shape 
and give content to the state judicial function.”126 Separation of powers 
concerns are perhaps most prominent among the reasons for federal courts, 
and the state courts following federal requirements,127 to exercise judicial 
restraint and defer to the political branches when a litigant does not meet 
Article III justiciability requirements.128 “Closely linked to the perceived need 
for judicial restraint,” Hershkoff writes, “is the concern that Article III 
decisionmaking is final and beyond popular revision.”129 
Obvious differences between federal and state governance make such 
separation of powers concerns less important at the state level for three 
reasons. First, unlike their federal counterparts, state courts are not organized 
under Article III of the federal Constitution. Thus, state judges are not 
constrained by the “cases” and “controversies” requirement that federal 
standing doctrine affirms and requires. Second, most state court judges are 
popularly elected, unlike federal judges.130 “Without the protection of life 
tenure, state judges appear beholden to popular approval.”131 Such popular 
                                                                                                                     
 124 See id. at 1427–28. 
 125 Hershkoff, supra note 97, at 1842. But see generally M. Ryan Harmanis, Note, 
States’ Stances on Public Interest Standing, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 729 (2015) (arguing that state 
courts should follow federal standing doctrine, particularly with respect to the public 
interest doctrine, because the federal doctrine provides notice to litigants as to what courts 
will adjudicate and delineates a consistent framework in determining whether a case or 
controversy exists).  
 126 Hershkoff, supra note 97, at 1906. Indeed, the Ohio Supreme Court has adopted the 
same standing formulation enunciated by the Supreme Court in Lujan. Moore v. 
Middletown, 975 N.E.2d 977, 982 (Ohio 2012). The federal standing doctrine was 
reaffirmed in the JobsOhio case. ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 13 N.E.3d 1101, 
1104 (Ohio 2014). 
 127 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984) (“[T]he law of Art[icle] III standing is 
built on a single basic idea—the idea of separation of powers.”).  
 128 Hershkoff, supra note 97, at 1886 (“That federal judges are unelected, and federal 
courts presumed undemocratic, figures prominently as a justification for Article III 
restraint.”); see also id. at 1886 n.275. 
 129 Id. at 1886. 
 130 Thirty-nine states currently hold some kind of election of judges, either through 
partisan election or by some type of merits-retention system. Adam Liptak, Judges on the 
Campaign Trail, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/28/ 
sunday-review/judges-on-the-campaign-trail.html [http://perma.cc/LE34-V9RK]. 
 131 Hershkoff, supra note 97, at 1887. 
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elections tend to alleviate countermajoritarian concerns that inhere in 
discussions surrounding the final, constitutionally binding decisions made by 
insulated, unelected federal judges.132 Third, the structures of state 
governments differ significantly from the federal model, undermining the 
separation of powers rationale that serves as a basis for federal judicial 
restraint.133 
The Supreme Court has expressly endorsed the idea that state courts 
should not be bound by federal standing doctrine. In ASARCO Inc. v. 
Kadish,134 the Court held that “the constraints of Article III do not apply to 
state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not bound by the limitations 
of a case or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability even when they 
address issues of federal law.”135 Plaintiffs in ASARCO were a collection of 
individual taxpayers and members of the Arizona Education Association.136 
They sought the invalidation of a state statute governing mineral leases 
because they allegedly did not comport with the leasing requirements intended 
by Congress when it passed the New Mexico-Arizona Enabling Act of 
1910.137 Defendants then sought review by the Supreme Court.138 After an 
analysis of standing precedent,139 the Court concluded that the plaintiffs in the 
original suit would not have satisfied federal justiciability requirements.140 
Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the decision of the Arizona Supreme 
Court invalidating the state statute for noncompliance with federal law.141 
“[T]he state judiciary . . . chose a different path, as was their right, and took no 
account of federal standing rules in letting the case go to final judgment in the 
Arizona courts.”142 The Court went on to recognize the importance of 
upholding the state court’s decision as a matter of deference to Arizona’s 
sovereignty.143 Important to note is the degree of breadth of the Court’s 
                                                                                                                     
 132 Id. 
 133 See id. at 1891–98.  
 134 ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989).  
 135 Id. at 617.  
 136 Id. at 610.  
 137 Id. For more discussion on ASARCO, see James W. Doggett, Note, “Trickle Down” 
Constitutional Interpretation: Should Federal Limits on Legislative Conferral of Standing 
Be Imported into State Constitutional Law?, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 851–54 (2008). 
 138 ASARCO, 490 U.S. at 610.  
 139 Id. at 611–16.  
 140 Id. at 616–17.  
 141 Id. at 633. 
 142 Id. at 617. 
 143 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, said:  
If we were to vacate the judgment below on the ground that respondents lacked 
federal standing when they brought suit initially, that disposition would render 
nugatory the entire proceedings in the state courts. The clear effect would be to 
impose federal standing requirements on the state courts whenever they adjudicate 
issues of federal law, if those judgments are to be conclusive on the parties. That 
result, however, would be contrary to established traditions and to our prior decisions 
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holding. Even when reviewing questions of application of federal law, state 
courts have the freedom to experiment with and diverge from federal 
justiciability requirements. The Court could have limited its decision to 
allowing divergence only on state law claims. Instead, it chose a more 
expansive interpretation that affirmed the preeminence of state sovereignty 
regarding questions of standing in state court.144 
In light of the Supreme Court holding in ASARCO, some commentators 
have urged their respective home state courts to take up the invitation to 
develop unique standing doctrines that diverge from the restrictive federal 
requirements.145 Like Hershkoff, these commentators highlight the differences 
in organizational structure between federal governance and state governance 
that should lead to experimentation with standing doctrine in state court, rather 
than lock-step adherence to federal requirements. Noting the prominence of 
separation of powers concerns in the federal judiciary as a reason for strict 
standing requirements, one scholar points out that state judges are often 
elected and therefore part of the “political branches.”146 In that sense, state 
judges are part of the very process to which federal judges often defer. Further, 
the concern at the federal level of judges enshrining a particular viewpoint in 
the Constitution is allayed by the ease of constitutional amendment at the state 
level.147 Such a fundamental difference in the structure of state governance 
from its federal counterpart counsels in favor of allowing state courts to 
deviate from federal standing doctrine.148 
                                                                                                                     
recognizing that the state courts are not bound by Article III and yet have it within 
both their power and their proper role to render binding judgments on issues of federal 
law, subject only to review by this Court. 
Id. at 620.  
 144 For an argument that state courts should be bound by federal justiciability 
requirements when hearing federal claims, see William A. Fletcher, The “Case or 
Controversy” Requirement in State Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 CALIF. L. 
REV. 263, 265 (1990), responding to the apparent anomaly produced by ASARCO that 
would effectively permit review “when a state court sustains the asserted federal claim, but 
denies review when the state court rejects the federal claim.” 
 145 See, e.g., Avis K. Poai, Hawai‘i’s Justiciability Doctrine, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 537, 
537–38 (2004) (arguing that Hawaii should not “cling” to federal justiciability standards 
because it is not bound by the Article III cases and controversies requirement); Stasha D. 
McBride, Note, Civil Procedure: Time to Stand Back: Unnecessary Gate-Keeping to 
Oklahoma Courts, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 177, 177 (2003) (arguing that Oklahoma should stop 
adhering to federal standing requirements and adopt its own, state-based standing doctrine 
out of recognition for the differences between federal and state and local governance). But 
see Kevin Hallstrom, Standing Down: The Negative Consequences of Expanding Hawai‘i’s 
Doctrine of Standing, 30 U. HAW. L. REV. 475, 475 (2008) (responding to Poai’s article by 
raising separation of powers concerns).  
 146 McBride, supra note 145, at 197–98.  
 147 Id. at 200.  
 148 Id. 
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In short, state courts should experiment with their standing doctrine in 
light of the multitude of differences among federal and state governance, as 
well as the Supreme Court’s express permission for state courts to do so. 
2. Public Policy Supports Broader State Court Standing 
Public policy supports the broadening of standing in state court to allow 
for the challenging of public–private development corporations for one simple 
reason: to hold elected officials in the legislative and executive branches 
accountable to their state constitution. The basic question boils down to this: if 
regular citizens cannot challenge the constitutionality of a state law, who can 
or will?149 
State courts should be more willing to hear constitutional challenges 
against development corporations by private citizens because, otherwise, 
elected officials will be able to behave with impunity, effectively amending 
the constitution by not following it. If legislative and executive branch 
officials know that they can create secretive organizations that provide 
subsidies to private businesses without fear of rebuke by the judicial branch, 
then those officials will do so freely. In other words, non-electoral constraints 
are needed to enforce the fiscal provisions of state constitutions in order to 
prevent political corruption.150 A nominal electoral process is insufficient to 
overcome the interests of politicians in continuing with the financial 
arrangements of a public–private development corporation. 
Some might argue that judges would be making policy best left to the 
“political” branches if they were to interpret the constitutionality of public–
private development corporations. This argument fails for two reasons. First, 
most state court judges are elected.151 As such, state judges could be 
considered “policy makers” in the sense that they must respond, in some 
fashion, to the popular will of the electorate. State judges are also less 
insulated than their federal counterparts due to their lack of life tenure. Even if 
one considered the interpretation of a state constitution to be policy making, 
then, such interpretation is less problematic at the state level. Second, judges 
                                                                                                                     
 149 See generally Joshua G. Urquhart, Disfavored Constitution, Passive Virtues? 
Linking State Constitutional Fiscal Limitations and Permissive Taxpayer Standing 
Doctrine, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1263 (2012) (discussing the implications of denying 
standing to taxpayers to sue to enforce state constitutional debt limits).  
 150 See Dave Ebersole, Democracy in Ohio: Ohio’s Fiscal Constitution and the 
Unconstitutional Nationwide Arena Deal, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 319, 320–46 (2012) 
(describing the public–private financing arrangements involved with the purchase of a 
sports stadium in Columbus, Ohio, and need for non-electoral restraints to prevent the 
expenditure of public funds in aid of such a private enterprise); cf. Brief of Amici Curiae 
Ohio Law Professors in Support of Defendants-Appellees JobsOhio, et al. at 23, 
ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 13 N.E.3d 1101 (Ohio 2014) (No. 2012-1272) 
(arguing that a taxpayer’s interest in the faithful adherence to his state’s constitution could 
be pursued through the political process, and need not be pursued in the court system).  
 151 See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
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would not, in fact, be making policy; they would simply be enforcing the 
constitution. Deciding whether a particular government-created arrangement 
violates the state constitution is the job judges were elected to do. 
A strong judicial role is necessary to ensure the legislative and executive 
branches follow the constitution. Expanding standing doctrine in state court 
can accomplish that need. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS: THE NEED FOR A STATE STANDING 
AMENDMENT 
Citizen groups cannot rely solely on state courts to grant standing to 
challenge the constitutionality of public–private development corporations, 
despite the legal and policy-based reasons for doing so. Although some courts 
have experimented with their standing doctrines, many continue to adhere to 
the traditional requirements enunciated by the federal court system. In light of 
state courts’ reluctance to develop judicial common law recognizing broad 
standing for citizens to challenge PPDCs under state constitutions, a more 
explicit method of conferring standard is necessary to ensure access to the 
courthouse. 
A. The Best Approach: Legislative Conferral of Standing or State 
Constitutional Amendment? 
What is the best method by which to confer standing onto private citizen 
groups to challenge the constitutionality of public–private development 
corporations? A state statute and a constitutional amendment each have their 
strengths and weaknesses. In terms of political will at the statewide level, 
future state judicial interpretation, and ability to persevere, a constitutional 
amendment is the better route. 
1. Legislative Conferral of Standing 
Causes of action in federal and state courts that are created by statute are 
referred to as “legislative conferrals of standing.”152 On the federal level, the 
Supreme Court has limited the ability of Congress to confer standing on 
private citizens in the absence of the concrete injury required by Article III.153 
According to the Court, the requirement that plaintiffs be sufficiently injured is 
unassailable under the Constitution.154 The Court has not completely closed 
                                                                                                                     
 152 Doggett, supra note 137, at 840 n.6. 
 153 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576–78 (1992). See also generally Robins 
v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 1892 (2015) 
(granting review on the question of whether Congress may confer Article III standing in 
the absence of a concrete harm).  
 154 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576 (“Whether the courts were to act on their own, or at the 
invitation of Congress, in ignoring the concrete injury requirement described in our cases, 
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the door on legislative conferral of standing, however, as Justice Kennedy has 
expressed an openness to allowing Congress to confer standing where no 
actual injury exists.155 
Although state courts are not required to follow federal standing 
doctrine,156 some state courts have continued to adhere to the justiciability 
requirements that the Constitution imposes upon federal courts.157 The 
Michigan Supreme Court, for example, found that the state legislature could 
not constitutionally confer standing onto private citizens who lacked “actual 
and particularized injuries.”158 In National Wildlife Federation v. Cleveland 
Cliffs Iron Co., plaintiffs sought to challenge the issuance of a permit for mine 
expansion to the Cleveland Cliffs Iron Company.159 The group brought suit 
under the Michigan Environmental Protection Act (MEPA), which allowed for 
“any person” to file a lawsuit for the protection of the environment.160 Despite 
such explicit legislative conferral of standing, the Michigan Supreme Court 
declined to honor the wishes of the legislature, referencing Article III of the 
federal Constitution and quoting Supreme Court decisions as a basis for its 
decision.161 
                                                                                                                     
they would be discarding a principle fundamental to the separate and distinct constitutional 
role of the Third Branch—one of the essential elements that identifies those ‘Cases’ and 
‘Controversies’ that are the business of the courts rather than of the political branches.”). 
 155 Id. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In my view, Congress has the power to 
define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy 
where none existed before . . . .”); see also Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 
501 (2009) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 156 See Doggett, supra note 137, at 851 (“Since state courts are not organized under the 
Federal Constitution, but rather under state constitutions, states have been free to vary 
justiciability standards in their courts from federal norms.”). See generally ASARCO v. 
Kadish, 490 U.S. 605 (1989); Hershkoff, supra note 97, at 1858–59.  
 157 See generally Michael E. Solimine, Recalibrating Justiciability in Ohio Courts, 51 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 531 (2004) (noting Ohio courts’ general acceptance of federal 
constitutional standing principles, despite the ability to diverge from Article III standing 
requirements, and concluding that federal standing doctrine is optimal and Ohio courts 
should continue to follow it).  
 158 Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron Co., 684 N.W.2d 800, 818 (2004). To 
be clear, the Michigan Supreme Court did not technically find the citizen suit provision of 
the state environmental statute unconstitutional; rather, the Court found the citizen group 
had standing to sue under traditional standing principles while unmistakably expressing its 
disdain toward the statute in dicta. See Heather Terry, Comment, Still Standing but “Teed 
Up”: The Michigan Environmental Protection Act’s Citizen Suit Provision After National 
Wildlife Federation v. Cleveland Cliffs, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1297, 1298. 
 159 Cleveland Cliffs, 684 N.W.2d at 804–05. 
 160 Id. at 805 n.1 (“The attorney general or any person may maintain an action in the 
circuit court having jurisdiction where the alleged violation occurred or is likely to occur 
for declaratory and equitable relief against any person for the protection of the air, water, 
and other natural resources and the public trust in these resources from pollution, 
impairment, or destruction.” (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.1701(1))). 
 161 Id. at 810–11 (“If the Legislature were permitted at its discretion to confer 
jurisdiction upon this Court unmoored from any genuine case or controversy, this Court 
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Similarly, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that a state statute 
conferring standing on private citizens was unconstitutional where the state 
was the real party in interest.162 In Lyons v. Ryan, a group of Illinois taxpayers 
sued on behalf of the state to recover public funds that were misused by former 
Governor and Secretary of State of Illinois, George Ryan.163 Ryan was 
accused of issuing drivers’ licenses to unqualified drivers in exchange for 
political contributions.164 The Court found that the state, rather than the group 
of taxpayers, was the real party in interest because the alleged fraud did not 
involve direct expenditure of any public funds—aside from the incidental use 
of funds, such as the salaries of employees involved in the fraud.165 As such, 
the Attorney General had wide discretion to pursue charges against the 
Governor in the state’s interest, and was the only officer with the 
constitutional authority to bring a claim against the Governor.166 In short, like 
the Cleveland Cliffs case and despite express legislative conferral of standing, 
the Illinois Supreme Court found that taxpayers did not have standing to sue 
under the state law, declaring the statute unconstitutional.167 
As these two cases demonstrate, even a state statute conferring standing 
onto citizen groups to bring lawsuits does not guarantee access to the 
courthouse. James Doggett, in “Trickle Down” Interpretation, has noted that 
                                                                                                                     
would be transformed in character and empowered to decide matters that have historically 
been within the purview of the Governor and the executive branch.”). One commentator 
has criticized the Court’s reliance on separation of powers arguments in following federal 
standing doctrine. Jennifer M. Minuchi, Comment, Judicial Branch Standing—The 
Decision to Apply Federal Judicial Standing in a State Forum and its Impact on a 
Government by, of, and for the People. National Wildlife Federation v. Cleveland Cliffs 
Iron Company, 684 N.W.2d 800 (Mich. 2004), 36 RUTGERS L.J. 1487, 1500 (2005). 
Interestingly, the Michigan Supreme Court later overturned the decision in Cleveland 
Cliffs, stating that Michigan courts should not be bound by federal standing doctrine. 
Lansing Sch. Educ. Ass’n v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 792 N.W.2d 686, 697 (2010) 
(“[Cleveland Cliffs] departed dramatically from historical jurisprudence in Michigan, and 
the bounds of the constitutional text, when [it] interpreted the Michigan Constitution to 
compel a standing doctrine that is essentially coterminous with the federal standing 
doctrine.”). For an argument that the Michigan Supreme Court’s overruling of Cleveland 
Cliffs and its return to non-federal standing doctrine may lead to “judicial confusion” and 
“a breakdown of constitutionally mandated separation of powers,” see Kenneth Charette, 
Comment, Standing Alone?: The Michigan Supreme Court, the Lansing Decision, and the 
Liberalization of the Standing Doctrine, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 199, 219–20 (2011).  
 162 Lyons v. Ryan, 780 N.E.2d 1098, 1106 (Ill. 2002).  
 163 Id. at 1100–01.  
 164 Id. at 1100. 
 165 Id. at 1104–05; Doggett, supra note 137, at 860. 
 166 Lyons, 780 N.E.2d at 1105. 
 167 Id. at 1106; see also Scachitti v. UBS Fin. Servs., 831 N.E.2d 544, 556 (Ill. 2005) 
(declaring as unconstitutional a state statute conferring standing on private citizens to sue 
on the state’s behalf in recovery of fraudulently obtained public funds because such 
conferral usurped the power of the Attorney General to represent the state in litigation). For 
a more in-depth discussion of these two Illinois cases, see Doggett, supra note 137, at 859–
63. 
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“certain state courts have begun to express skepticism toward legislative 
conferral of standing,” while relying on U.S. Supreme Court decisions to 
support their skepticism.168 In fact, a number of state courts have incorporated 
an injury-in-fact requirement into their state constitutional jurisprudence, 
despite their ability to experiment with standing doctrine.169 
Although some state courts have broken away from the lock-step 
adherence to federal standing doctrine,170 legislative conferral of standing is an 
unreliable way of allowing private citizens access to the courthouse to 
challenge unconstitutional governmental action. Given the reluctance on the 
part of state courts to experiment with standing doctrine, a more venerable 
method of conferring standing is necessary to ensure citizen groups can 
challenge the constitutionality of public–private development corporations in 
court. 
2. State Constitutional Amendment 
A state constitutional amendment avoids the potential gap faced by 
legislative conferral of standing. By enshrining the right of citizens to 
challenge the legality of public–private development corporations in the state 
constitution, a state court cannot decline to reach the merits of a case simply 
by adhering to federal justiciability requirements, out of a sense that such 
adherence is a wise practice.171 Instead, state courts would be required, under 
their respective constitutions, to decide whether such economic development 
arrangements are permissible. 
Two viable methods exist for amending a state’s constitution—through the 
state legislature or by voter referendum. Passage of an amendment granting 
standing to citizen groups would be most easily attained through a state 
legislature, in terms of the number of people needed to agree to such an 
amendment. After all, most state legislatures contain less than two hundred 
members,172 while a voter referendum would require the affirmative vote of 
thousands of regular citizens. On the other hand, given that the legislature 
would have been the entity to initially create a public–private development 
corporation, state legislators may conceivably be reluctant to allow citizens to 
challenge the corporation’s constitutionality. 
                                                                                                                     
 168 Doggett, supra note 137, at 855.  
 169 Id. at 855 n.100 (collecting cases). 
 170 Id. at 840 (“[M]any state appellate courts have concluded that state legislatures may 
constitutionally confer standing onto private citizens to represent the public interest in 
court.”); id. at 840–41 n.9 (collecting cases). 
 171 See generally Harmanis, supra note 125 (arguing that state courts should develop a 
more restricted version of public interest standing, in part, because of the wisdom of the 
federal “case or controversy” requirement). 
 172 Number of Legislators and Length of Terms in Years, NAT’L CONF. ST. 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/number-of-legislators-
and-length-of-terms.aspx [http://perma.cc/8PUJ-563Q] (last updated Mar. 11, 2013). 
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As such, voter referenda may be the only realistic option of passing a state 
constitutional amendment to allow private citizen groups to challenge the 
constitutionality of public–private development corporations. Direct 
democracy, as some commentators refer to it, has a long history going back to 
at least the Progressive Era at the beginning of the twentieth century.173 
Constitutional amendment by initiative “empowers citizens, by petition, to 
require a popular vote on whether to adopt a” change to the state 
constitution.174 
One type of voter referendum,175 called the direct constitutional initiative, 
has the benefit of requiring no involvement by the state legislature or members 
of the executive branch.176 A group of concerned citizens, such as 
ProgressOhio, would merely need to pass precirculation review by the state’s 
secretary of state or attorney general and then collect the threshold number of 
signatures to place a question on the ballot.177 Arizona, for example, requires 
signatures of 15% of the electorate who last voted for governor before a 
constitutional amendment proposition will be placed on the ballot.178 
Michigan requires the signatures of 10% of total voters in the last 
gubernatorial election.179 Ohio similarly requires the signatures of 10% of 
gubernatorial voters, but also requires the signatures of at least 5% of the 
qualified electors in each of one-half of the counties in the state.180 
The downside to direct constitutional initiative is its relative lack of 
prevalence among states with public–private development corporations. Only 
sixteen states in total allow for direct constitutional initiative, and only four of 
those states—Arizona, Florida, Michigan, and Ohio—are ones with PPDCs.181 
Voters in these four states will have a relatively easy time placing before the 
electorate the question of whether the state constitution should be amended to 
                                                                                                                     
 173 Marvin Krislov & Daniel M. Katz, Taking State Constitutions Seriously, 17 
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 295, 300 (2008).  
 174 Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle, Structuring the Ballot Initiative: Procedures 
That Do and Don’t Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 47, 49 (1995).  
 175 A number of different types of voter referenda exist. For instance, voters may 
approve or disapprove an already-enacted piece of legislation through a Popular 
Referendum. The legislature may also place before voters particular questions in a process 
called a Legislative Referendum. Also available are Direct Statutory Initiative—whereby 
citizens place on the ballot a proposed statute to be enacted—and Indirect Statutory 
Initiative, which requires pre-approval from the legislature. For a more detailed discussion, 
see Krislov & Katz, supra note 173, at 302–04. 
 176 See id. at 303. 
 177 See id. at 310–21 for a full discussion on how an interest group might pass a 
constitutional amendment through direct initiative from start to finish. 
 178 COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, BOOK OF THE STATES 14 tbl.1.3 (2014 ed.), 
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/1.3%202014.pdf [http://perma.cc/CN7F-
C6LA] (summarizing the constitutional amendment procedure by initiative). 
 179 Id.  
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
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allow private citizens to challenge the constitutionality of the state’s 
development corporation. On the other hand, citizens in Indiana, Maryland, 
North Carolina, Rhode Island, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming will have to 
rely on more indirect measures of enshrining the right to sue their state’s 
PPDC in the state constitution.182 
B. Text of Proposed Standing Amendment 
The text of a uniform state constitutional amendment that confers standing 
on private citizens to challenge the constitutionality of public–private 
development corporations in state court might read as follows: 
1. Any private citizen of this State, regardless of whether he or she has 
suffered a concrete and particularized injury, shall have standing to challenge 
the constitutionality in state court of any public–private development 
corporation, which receives public funding for any aspect of its operation; 
provides publicly or privately funded support to any private enterprise, 
business, or company through direct grant of money, tax subsidy, or any other 
special privilege designed to attract the relocation to or continued presence in 
this state of said enterprise, business, or company; and is organized under the 
laws of this state; 
2. No time limitations shall be imposed on the filing of citizen suits to 
challenge the constitutionality of the creation of such development 
corporations. 
3. Interpretation of this Section should be broadly construed so as to reach the 
merits of any constitutional challenge brought hereunder. 
C. Rationale of Amendment and Implications 
A uniform standing amendment, likely to be adopted through citizen 
initiative, is a satisfactory solution to the problem of private citizens failing to 
meet traditional standing requirements to sue development corporations for 
two general reasons. First, as the Supreme Court of the United States has 
noted, state courts are not bound by the same justiciability requirements as 
federal courts.183 Commentators have further argued that the state court system 
is a particularly suitable place for the vindication of public rights by private 
individuals that would otherwise be impossible in the federal court system.184 
Therefore, state courts are appropriate venues for granting more liberal 
standing rights to private citizens, as they are not constrained by federal 
                                                                                                                     
 182 See supra note 175. 
 183 ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (recognizing the right of state 
courts not to follow the dictates of the Supreme Court’s Article III standing jurisprudence). 
 184 John DiManno, Note, Beyond Taxpayers’ Suits: Public Interest Standing in the 
States, 41 CONN. L. REV. 639 (2008) (arguing that state courts are uniquely situated to 
adopt public interest standing models); see also Hershkoff, supra note 97, at 1834; Poai, 
supra note 145; McBride, supra note 145. 
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standing principles. Second, an amendment conferring standing on private 
citizens is particularly appropriate because it represents the democratic will of 
the electorate. 
The proposed uniform state constitutional amendment accomplishes three 
things with its three prongs. First, the amendment confers standing on any 
state citizen to sue a JobsOhio-like development corporation. Importantly, the 
first prong of the amendment limits constitutional challenges to those 
development corporations that receive public funds and funnel some of that 
money to benefit private enterprise. This prong will serve to bar frivolous 
lawsuits against state development agencies that are part of state government, 
and therefore do not operate behind a “veil of secrecy.” Second, the 
amendment prohibits a statute of limitations from barring constitutional 
challenges to the creation of a public–private development corporation. Suits 
challenging particular actions of a development corporation may still be time-
barred by the legislature. Finally, the third prong directs a court to reach the 
merits of a constitutional challenge brought under the amendment if at all 
possible. This clause should protect against any attempts by judges to 
circumvent the language of the amendment. For instance, a state court might 
try to locate a loophole in the “corporation” language of the amendment’s text 
by holding that a PPDC organized as a limited liability company or partnership 
is shielded from suit. The “interpretation” clause, however, will give advocates 
ammunition to persuade a reticent court to reach the merits question of the 
constitutionality of its state’s PPDC. 
Practically speaking, the above amendment will be able to garner the 
requisite support in states with direct constitutional initiative options. Groups 
like ProgressOhio and the Goldwater Institute in Arizona have been bothered 
by the lack of transparency and accountability—as well as the questionable 
constitutionality—of their respective state’s PPDC. Accordingly, with 
amendment language that guarantees the right to challenge such corporations, 
these groups will acquire the necessary support among similarly frustrated 
citizens to at least gain access to the ballot. The limited scope of the language 
will then aid in the passage of the ballot initiative before the general public. 
The amendment does not declare the state’s PPDC unconstitutional; it merely 
provides a means to challenge the PPDC’s constitutionality. As such, it is less 
controversial than a more broadly worded amendment might be (e.g., an 
amendment that confers standing to challenge any potential violation of the 
state constitution). 
By enshrining the conferral of standing on citizens in a state’s 
constitution—as opposed to a statute—state courts will be compelled to 
recognize the ability of interest groups to challenge the constitutionality of 
public–private development corporations like JobsOhio. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Public-private development corporations like JobsOhio were incorporated 
for the same purpose as state economic development agencies—to spur job 
creation, economic growth, and to attract tourism to their respective states. 
Unlike state departments of economic development, PPDCs are often not 
subject to public records laws, procurement procedures, or other mechanisms 
that ensure transparency and accountability. These “veils of secrecy” create a 
problem when virtually every state constitution contains provisions prohibiting 
the commingling of public money with aid to private enterprise. Given many 
state courts’ adherence to rigid federal standing doctrine, however, groups 
seeking to challenge the constitutionality of PPDCs in state court may find the 
doors to the courthouse are closed. 
This Note has proposed that states with JobsOhio-like development 
corporations adopt constitutional amendments to allow private citizens to 
challenge the constitutionality of such corporations. Through direct 
constitutional initiative or other means, citizens may place the amendment on 
the ballot to be voted on by the general public. An amendment conferring 
standing to sue will ensure that access to the courthouse will be guaranteed for 
citizens “to discover whether their government has been true to the 
Constitution.”185 
  
                                                                                                                     
 185 ProgressOhio.org, Inc. v. JobsOhio, 13 N.E.3d 1110, 1114 (Ohio 2014) (Pfeifer, J., 
dissenting).  

